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Much had been written in Islamic (notably in Arabic and Persian) and Western (particularly English and 
French) languages about the monumental mujaddid (Islamic reformer) and political activist Jamāl al-Dīn 
al-Husaini (1838-1897), popularly known by his self- styled pseudonym “al-Afghāni”. Nonetheless, this 
article revisits him mainly because the challenges that the Islamic world faced and which he tried, in vain, 
to address during his turbulent time remain basically the same in our chaotic time, even in a much acute 
form after the historic September 11, 2001 incident. Chief among those are the devastating Shi'i-Sunni 
conflict and the accelerating Western cultural and physical invasion of the Muslim world. The article 
attempts to give a fresh interpretation and assessment of Afghāni’s complex character, stormy life and 
religo-political legacy. The study also poses a presumably interesting question, namely, why Afghāni’s 
visionary thought was not acclaimed during his life, and may it be recalled now to address the stubborn 
problem that the Muslims are currently facing, particularly the Muslim-Muslim confrontation in Iraq, 
Syria and elsewhere, and the general disarray of the Ummah? 
 In a related vein, the paper dwells at some length on the position of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghāni towards the 
Mahdist revolution (1881-1885) that erupted in the Sudan almost at the same time of his arrival in 
Europe, an issue that has hardly been addressed in the in all the scholarly works on the Sudanese 
Mahdiyya. The study argues that the assertion of some European writers that al-Afghāni had viewed 
himself as a “messianic saviour”, a “Muslim Luther” or even a “Mahdi” goes too far and appears to be 
engendered by over-reading of some of his literature. Depending on some of al-Afghāni’s articles in his 
organ al-Urwah Al-Wuthqa and other related literature, the study maintains that he tried, also in vain, to 
channel the spectacular victories of the Mahdist revolution in the service of his ambitious political 
agenda. Chief among those were to recharge self confidence in the then apathetic Muslim masses, and 
hence to end European political imperialism, cultural domination and economic exploitation of the 
Muslim world. Besides, al-Afghāni seems to have considered to use his alleged, but unfounded, 
‘paramount influence’ and ‘extensive contacts’ with the Mahdists to score a diplomatic victory over the 
British i.e. to offer to be a go-between the British and his presumed ‘friends’- the militant Mahdists. But 
the British governments quickly realised the gross inaccuracy of al-Afghāni’s jargon, and discarded once 




Al-AfghÉnÊ lived his life very publicly, and was indeed a source of heated controversy in the Muslim 
world of the last quarter of the 19th century and afterwards.  Even his origin was a source of furious 
debate.  Having an axe to grind, his numerous adversaries among the ruling elite, the court ulemÉ’ and 
even the ultra-secularists orchestrated a campaign to discredit him, particularly among the Sunni 
Muslims.  They claimed that he was Persian by birth, in the Iranian town Asadabad, and that he received 
his formative education at the hands of ShiÑi instructors.  As Albert Hourani plausibly maintained, there 
may be some internal evidence to support this view, mainly derived from AfghÉnÊ’s own writings and 
speeches.  He was, for, example, well versed in Islamic philosophy, particularly the Avicennian thought 
which was more readily available in ShiÑi’s centres of learning than in those of Sunni Islam.1  However, 
by emphasizing, in fact overemphasizing, his Persianism and ShiÑism, his enemies were seemingly not 
essentially after the truth, but wanted to refute AfghÉnÊ’s claim to be the spokesman of Sunni Muslims 
amongst whom he spent the greater part of his life.  Moreover, they aspired to demonstrate that he was 
subservient to the Persians, “Kalb al-ÑAjam” (the Dog of the Persians), as one of them had rudely 
recorded.2  This charge of being a “stooge” was also extended to the Europeans where he was asserted 
to have been at one time or another in the pay of the French, the British or the Russians.  Paradoxically, 
AfghÉnÊ was also attacked by the militant secularist elite for whom he was no more than “an ignorant 
reactionary.”3 
To counteract this persistent campaign, AfghÉnÊ and his disciples insisted that he was a Sayyid 
(descendant of the Prophet) and a doctrinal Hanafi Sunni who was well versed and faithful to Islamic 
tenants and principles.4  In response to the sarcastic appellation that his archenemy Shaykh AbË al-HudÉ 
al-SayyÉdÊ5 attached to his name, i.e. “al-Mut´affghin” (the false Afghani), Jamal al-Dein and his students 
insisted that he was born to a princely Afghani family in an Afghan village, and that he moved with his 
family at the age of eight to Kabul.  However, another version claims that he was Persian by origin but an 
Afghani by upbringing, in the sense that his Persian family migrated to BilÉd al-AfghÉn where he was 
born. 
AfghÉnÊ maintained a very low opinion of the Muslim rulers of his time, both in Sunni and ShiÑi 
countries, who, to him, suffered from the tyrant delusion that only God can take them from power.  He 
accused them of despotism, corruption, selfishness and total betrayal of the Muslim populace.  
Moreover, being straightforward and courageous, he never told the powerful what they wished to hear, 
and was usually bold and unceremonial, even blunt, with them.6 His rocky relations with the rulers were 
appropriately summarised by Albert Hourani in the following long passage that deserves to be recorded 
in full: 
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“Al-Afghani did not belong to the quietist majority of Muslim thinkers, who believed 
that they should protest against injustice but submit to it; he accepted rather the 
view of the minority who believed in the right to revolt.  Each time then a ruler 
disappointed him he turned against him violently, and his opposition served to 
strengthen the constitutionalist and nationalist movements which had begun to 
appear.  For their part, the rulers, who had hoped that he would rally Muslim 
sentiment behind their thrones, found that his real intention was to use their power 
in the service of Islam.”7    
What had further complicated AfghÉnÊ’s relations with the ruling elite was his complex character, for he 
was seemingly full of himself, obstinate, short-tempered and untamable, in the phrase of his British 
friend Blunt,8 “a wild man of genius”.  AfghÉnÊ “difficult” character was also confirmed by many of his 
biographers, including his loyal disciple Muhammed ÑAbdu, who described him by such phrases as 
“ÍadÊd al-mizÉj” and “ÑaÎabi damawi fÊ mizÉjihi”,9  i.e., short tempered.   
With such high esteem and highhandedness, AfghÉnÊ had throughout his career focused on appealing, 
even guiding, the very traditional rulers, whom he disrespected, to attain his revolutionary programme 
of reform.  But he hardly cared to appeal to the people, and had totally neglected to establish for himself 
and his movement a popular organisation.  This lifelong mistake was probably the major factor for his 
misfortune of not seeing during his lifetime the fruits of his ideas, i.e., the awakening of the Muslim 
populace.  Towards the end of his life, AfghÉnÊ seemed to have realized this mistake as he bitterly 
recorded in a letter sent from prison to an anonymous Iranian friend, 
 
“Would that I had sown all the seed of my ideas in the receptive grounds of the 
people’s thoughts!  Well would it have been had I not wasted this fruitful and 
beneficent seed of mine in the salt and sterile soil of that effete sovereignty!  For 
what I had sowed in that soil never grow and what I had planted in that brackish 
earth perished away.  During all this time none of my well-intentioned counsels sank 
in the ears of the rulers of the East, whose selfishness and ignorance prevented 
them from accepting my words….”10  
However, as expected, this defiant, but seemingly short-sighted, strategy of reform drastically failed, and 
AfghÉnÊ’s relations with each and every ruler that he dealt with quickly broke down. They found it easy 
and convenient to indiscriminately declare him as a persona non grata, and expel him from their 
countries. The outcome was, as explained below, a troubled life and career that was characterised by 
endless wondering in Muslim and European countries.  While exposing al-AfghÉnÊ to considerable 
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hardship and was probably a factor for his sparse writings,11 this obligatory mobility had, nonetheless, 
advertised him and his ideas in many corners of the world. 
Our first information about AfghÉnÊ was during his early youth, around 1856/57, and in India.  Having 
already been well versed in Islamic knowledge, he devoted his over one-year stay in India to establish his 
first contact with the scientific and mathematical knowledge of modern Europe.  His next destination 
was Hijaz where he stayed for a year after which he left to Afghanistan.  He indulged himself there in the 
troubled local Afghan politics, but was eventually deported because he backed the wrong side in the civil 
war of 1863-65.12  Hence, he returned, around 1866, to India, but, pressured by the British authorities, 
he restricted his movements and contacts.  After a one-month stay in India, he moved to Egypt where he 
stayed for a very short duration (forty days or so) during which he met for the first time his future loyal 
disciple MuÍammed ÑAbdu, then a young Azharite student, and interacted with other students of al-
Azhar, including some Syrians.  Subsequently, he moved to Istanbul, where he was initially protected by 
the liberal minister Riad Pasha, and was employed in the board of education.  But the revolutionary ideas 
that he exhibited and voiced aroused the bitter hostility of the conservative and orthodox ÑulemÉ’, led 
by the then shaykh al-ÑulemÉ’ Hassan Fahmi Afendi,13  who accused AfghÉnÊ of insulting the 
prophethood in a public lecture on industries that he gave in the University off DÉr al-FunËn. Thus, he 
was expelled from Istanbul to arrive in Egypt in 1871. 
The circumstances that brought AfghÉnÊ to Egypt and the conditions for his stay there were a source of 
controversy.  His best known disciple MuÍammed ÑAbdu maintained that his master came to Egypt as a 
tourist, and without any intention to stay there.  But he did so on the plea of the minister MuÎÏafa RiÉd 
(1834-1911), who admired AfghÉnÊ’s scholarship since his days in Istanbul.  In recognition of his 
eminence, ÑAbdu continued, RiaÌ allocated for him an unconditional gratuity of 1,000 piaster.  But 
another source claims that the sum was in fact a salary that was given to him, with a room in al-Azhar 
dormitory, on condition that he teaches in al-Azhar strictly according to the principles of the sharÊÑah 
and religion.  However, AfghÉnÊ eventually vacated his Azhar lodging and took a house in the Jewish 
quarter of Cairo, which, with a nearby café, became the meeting places with his followers and admirers 
among the elite.14  
Whether a tourist or an asylum seeker, the personal prestige of the charismatic AfghÉnÊ had steadily 
increased among the elite during his eight-year stay in the country, thanks to his magnetic personality as 
well as some important developments.  First was the accelerating intervention of European powers, 
particularly Britain and France, and their tight control, since 1876, of the finances of the Egyptian 
government under the guise of recovering the huge amounts of loans that the “impatient modernizer”, 
i.e. Khedive IsmÉÑÊl, had recklessly borrowed from European banks and creditors.  In his desperate 
attempt to restore his power, the Khedive had tactically put a nationalist face and cautiously welcomed 
AfghÉnÊ, who was known for his adamant opposition to British and other European meddling in the 
affairs of the Muslim countries, particularly Egypt and India.  But the fundamental differences between 
the positions and outlooks of the despotic IsmÉÑÊl and the shuratic AfghÉnÊ were irreconcilable; hence, 
as expected, they soon departed.  However, AfghÉnÊ’s presumed membership, or presidency, of the 
secret Arab Masonic society, which advocated modernist and reformist ideas, put him in touch with 
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some eminent Egyptian politicians, administrators, journalists, army officers and the like.  But AfghÉnÊ’s 
most important success and impact was among some young intellectuals, Azharites and otherwise. 
Prominent among those were his principal disciple MuÍammed ÑAbdu (1849-1905) and, later 
MuÍammad RashÊd RiÌa (1865-1935), the owner and editor of the famous Journal al-ManÉr, who had 
both upheld and advertised their mentor’s legacy.  They also included SaÑad ZaghlËl (1857-1927), the 
undisputed leader of the post world war one Egyptian nationalist movement, and the eloquent orator of 
ÑUrÉbi’s revolution ÑAbdullah al-NadÊm. 
In his biography of the UstÉdh15, ÑAbdu admirably reported that the charismatic and learned AfghÉnÊ 
introduced them to mathematical subjects such as algebra and geometry as well as the discipline of 
philosophy and its offshoot logic.  He also gave them a unique insight on the Islamic disciplines of KalÉm 
(theology), Fiqh (jurisprudence), TafsÊr (exegesis), ×adÊth and Sufism, and persuaded them to actively 
engage in al-KhiÏÉboh (oratory) and “fan al-KhiÏÉbah” (the art of writing) that was at the time mastered 
by very few Egyptian literates.16 
 
It is worth noting here that while in Egypt, and indeed afterwards, al-AfghÉnÊ gave a push to non-
governmental and non-official press.  Some journals were founded in the 1870s and 1880’s by his 
followers and associates e.g., the weekly Jaridat MiÎr, founded in 1877 by SalÊm al-NaqÉsh, MiÎr al-
QÉhira, published in 1880 in Paris by AdÊb IsÍÉq, the famous first satirical paper in Egypt Abu NaÌÉrah of 
Jacob (James) Sanua17 and Mir’Ét al-Sharq of IbrÉhÊm al-LaqgÉnÊ in 1879.  Over and above all these 
papers was, of course, AfghÉnÊ’s own magazine al-ÑUrwah al-Wuthqa that was subsequently published 
in Paris.18  These and other papers had, directly or indirectly, played a significant role in blossoming 
AfghÉnÊ’s image19  and supporting his major theme, namely opposition to absolution and foreign 
intervention in the entire Muslim world.  In the light of these facts and the political realities of the last 
quarter of the 19th century, Prof. Elie Kedurie’s assertion of “Afghani’s …mediocre Journalism”20 seems to 
be unfair. 
While inciting through personal contacts, speeches and writings the Egyptian populace against European 
encroachment and its raison d’être Khedive IsmÉÑÊl, al-AfghÉnÊ tried to develop a working relation with 
his son and heir apparent, who was said to be a member of al-Sayyid’s masonic lodge.  TawfÊq seemed 
to have promised al-AfghÉnÊ and the nationalists in general that he would undertake serious reforms 
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that would establish the shËrÉ and the rule of law if and when he ascends the throne.  Hence was their 
tacit blessing of the Sultan’s firman of June 1879 that summarily dismissed Khedive IsmÉÑÊl and 
appointed TawfÊq in his place.   
TawfÊq had initially put a liberal face, nominated Sharif Pasha, nicknamed “father of the Egyptian 
constitution”, to the premiership and allowed him to draft a constitution.  However, it soon became 
apparent that this move was just a clever piece of eyewash, and that the new Khedive was simply buying 
time.  For once he was on the saddle, he rejected SharÊf’s project to enact a constitution, and dismissed 
him in mid August from the premiership to be followed by RÊaÌ, who was recalled from exile.  TawfÊq, 
who had by then become a virtual stooge of Britain, next targeted AfghÉnÊ whom he thought to be a 
danger to his regime, even harbouring to change it into a republic.  This was particularly so after a series 
of powerful speeches in which AfghÉnÊ said that Khedive TawfÊq was “compelled to serve, consciously 
or not, British ambitions”, and ended “by a war cry against the foreigner and by a call for a revolution to 
save the independence of Egypt and establish its liberty”.  However, the official reason given for his 
arrest and deportation to Hyderabad in India, as elaborated in a long document signed by the Director of 
Publications and published in the press on 28 August 1879, was his alleged organization of a secret 
society composed of “ShubbÉn dhawÊ al-battsh (young thugs),  whose aim was “to ruin religion and 
rule”.21 AfghÉnÊ and his disciples vigorously, but to no avail, denied this accusation, and, in protest, some 
of the papers that were published by his followers refused to publish the press release. 
During his crucial nine years in Egypt (1871-79), AfghÉnÊ had, no doubt, left his fingerprints, and was 
instrumental in the intellectual renaissance of the country.  His major success was among the elite of 
whom many were bound to him by strong ties of love, even adoration.  But in Egypt, as elsewhere, he 
neglected to establish for his movement a popular political base, and entirely depended on his presumed 
ability to control and guide the Khedives.  As suggested above, this lack of realism and tact had cost him 
and his movement dearly. 
After his ordeal in Egypt, the disillusioned and frustrated AfghÉnÊ was sent to India where he stayed for 
three years, from late 1879 to late 1882, mainly in the Muslim southern state of Hyderabad and in 
Calcutta, then the capital of British India.  Our limited information about this transitional sojourn is 
mainly derived from British documents and from AfghÉnÊ’s own writings, speeches and interactions with 
some thinkers.    
It is worth dwelling at this juncture on the conflicting positions of al-AfghÉnÊ and the Indian reformist 
Ahmed Khan (1817-1898) on the issue of the British presence in India.  While AfghÉnÊ continued his anti-
British agitation on the grounds that political independence is a pre-requisite to all kinds of reform, 
Ahmed Khan maintained that the British were too strong to be dislodged and that violence against them 
will aggravate the already grave misery of the Indian Muslim community.  He continued to argue that the 
British, who had favoured the Hindus in the past because they mistakenly viewed the Indian revolt of 
1857 to be solely Muslim, appeared to be increasingly inclined to reverse this policy to rally Muslim 
support “as a conservative counterweight to the more nationalist middle-class Hindus”.22  Hence, Ahmed 
Khan advocated what he considered to be tactical cooperation with the British, founded the Anglo-
oriental College to offer British-style education and encouraged Muslim to increasingly enter 
government service.  By the end of the day, his moderate programme “far overshadowed AfghÉnÊ’s anti-
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British programme among the Indian Muslims of the late 19th century.”23  Once more, as was the case in 
Egypt and elsewhere, AfghÉnÊ’s overwhelming dependence on the elite was arguably instrumental in his 
failure to enlist popular support among the Indian Muslim community.  Not many seemed to have cared 
about his harassment and expulsion from India by the British authorities.  AfghÉnÊ was so disheartened 
that he sought asylum in Europe, to be the earliest, or one of the earliest, Islamist reformers to be a 
political refugee in the West in modern times. 
AfghÉnÊ brutal attack on Ahmed Khan was not only verbally, but also in writing.  While in India and 
afterwards, he wrote many articles against Ahmed Khan and his supporters, whom he belittled by giving 
them the appellation the neicheriyya (i.e., the naturalists) sect or group, and the “Aghuris”, who were 
reputed to be the least respected caste in India.  An examples of such articles was a piece published in 
India under the title “The Aghuris with Pomp and Show,” and an article subsequently published al-
ÑUrwah al-WuthqÉ under the title “al-DahriËn fÊ al-Hind” (The Materialists in India). But his most severe 
onslaught on the “naturalists” was his major book written in Persian in 1881, entitled in English 
rendering by Prof. Nikki Keddie, “The Truth of the Naichiri Sect and an Explanation of the Neicheris.”  The 
book was also translated in Urdu in 1883, and in Arabic in 1886.  The latter translation was undertaken 
by Muhammed ÑAbdu with the help of Afghani’s niece and confidant, ÑArif Affendi, popularly known as 
Abu TurÉb, under the title “Al-Radd ÑalÉ al-DahriyyÊn” (Refutation of the Materialists), Beirut 1886.  
Under the guise of answering a question by a Muslim from Hyderabad, AfghÉnÊ elaborately discussed in 
this book the issue of the neicheriyya throughout history, and came to the conclusion that it has always 
represented a serious threat to the fundamentals of all religions, including Islam.  To AfghÉnÊ, the pillars 
of all religions that had been consistently undermined by the materialists were six in number: three 
“beliefs” and three “qualities”.  The former were “man is the noblest of all creatures”, “his community is 
the noblest one”, and that “he has come into the world to acquire accomplishments worthy of 
transferring him to a world more excellent, higher, faster and more perfect than this narrow and dark 
world that really deserves the name of the Abode of Sorrows”.  The three “qualities” that arise from 
these three “beliefs” are consecutively “shame” (hayÉ’), “trustworthiness” (amÉna) and “truthfulness” 
(Îidq). Ahmed Khan’s materialist sect was nothing but a continuation of this historical atheist drive.  The 
book even claims that “The first doctrine of this sect is the overthrow of religions.”24 
Ahmed Khan had admittedly been accused of heresy by some religious quarters, so had AfghÉnÊ 
himself.25  These charges and counter charges of atheism or agnosticism (al-Riddah in Islamic Jargon) had 
been, and are still, so ridiculously prevalent in the Muslim world that they should not always be taken 
seriously.26  For they were usually heavily politically loaded, and AfghÉni’s accusation to Ahmed Khan did 
not seem to have been an exception.  However, the book under discussion served the cause of AfghÉnÊ 
to demonstrate his strong Sunni beliefs and to pose himself as a genuine defender of Sunni Islam, even 
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its spokesman.  As argued below27, this book and other writings might have also facilitated AfghÉnÊ’s 
plan, then in the making, of working with the Sultan – Caliph ÑAbd al-Hameid II. 
Apparently concerned about his personal safety vis a vis the harassment of British interrogators, who 
viewed him as an envoy of ÑUrabÊ to incite the Muslims against the British government in India, AfghÉnÊ 
voluntarily left India for Paris via Port Said and London.  While transiting across Port Said, he sent letters 
to former’ friends and patrons in Cairo requesting protection for two of his close disciples, MuÍammed 
ÑAbdu and IbrÉhÊm al-LaggÉnÊ, and help for his emissary AbË TurÉb, whom he was sending to Cairo to 
recover some cash arrears that the Egyptian government owned him, and his books that were 
confiscated at the time of his expulsion from Egypt.    During his brief stay in London, AfghÉnÊ was 
hosted in the house of his friend Blunt, and was mainly engaged in writing violent anti-British articles for 
a London-based Arabic newspaper al-NaÍla, under such titles as “English policy in Eastern Countries” and 
“The Reasons for War in Egypt”. 
However, throughout his eight years stay in Egypt and for the most part of his sojourn in India, AfghÉnÊ 
had hardly talked about or wrote on Muslim Unity.  The focus of his attention was the formation of a 
united front of all the inhabitants irrespective of their religious beliefs, which was glaringly reflected in 
his repeated appeals to the glories of ancient Egypt and the glorious Hindu past.  The prevailing 
conditions in the two countries seemed to have convinced him that an appeal to cultural or linguistic 
nationalism, rather than Pan-Islamic ideas, would be a more effective anti-imperialist weapon. Unlike the 
20th century two most prominent Indian Islamic revivalists, MuÍammed IqbÉl (1877-1938) and AbË ÑAlÉ 
MawdudÊ (1903-1977) who viewed nationalism and Islamism to be at loggerheads, AfghÉnÊ seemed to 
have been of the opinion that they were different but not necessarily contradictory, and could be used 
together as communal strategies against imperialism.   In any case, AfghÉnÊ advocacy of Hindu-Muslim 
cooperation negated the presumption that he was the originator of an Indian-Muslim state that 
materialised by the creation of Pakistan in 1947. 
However, towards the end of his stay in India, AfghÉnÊ seemed to have experienced a major change in 
strategy and conviction.  Rather than focusing on national unity, he switched to Pan-Islamism as the best 
means to end the shackles of imperialism, and to restore the dignity of the Muslims.  Thus, since 1881, 
he presented himself to the Muslims as the defender of Islam and the champion of Muslim unity.  
Similarly, by then a significant shift in his position towards the Ottoman Sultan could be detected.  While 
viewing the Sultan suspiciously in the past, even a stumbling block in the way of the implementation of 
his revolutionary programme, AfghÉnÊ had now felt that ÑAbd al-×ameid II had become too prestigious 
and popular to be ignored or antagonized.  Hence, he started to appease him by various ways and 
means, and to explore the possibility of working with him.  A close look at the Refutation of the 
Materialists shows that it included some remarks that could have been incorporated to please the 
Sultan.  He explicitly, and for the first time, used the Quranic phrase “al-ÑUrwah al-Wuthqa” (The 
Indissoluble Bond) to describe the Caliphate, and claimed that the true reason for the British occupation 
of Egypt in 1882 was to counter the resounding success that Sultan ÑAbd al-×ameid had had in rallying 
the Muslim behind the Caliphate. When Blunt sought AfghÉnÊ’s advice about his projected visit to 
Istanbul in late 1883, the latter cautioned his friend not to say anything negative about the Sultan, and to 
be cautious about his pet idea of the establishment of an Arab Caliphate in Mecca, that had apparently 
appealed to the British government to counter the influence of the Ottoman Sultan. 
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But AfghÉnÊ’s two-year or so stay in Paris, March 1883 – 1884, was of outstanding significance to his 
career and legacy.  Paris was convenient for his anti-British and revolutionary political plan because of 
the then strained relations between Britain and France resulting from the British unilateral occupation of 
Egypt in 1882 that infuriated both the French government and public opinion.  AfghÉnÊ hoped for and 
got French support, but it was not as extensive and conclusive as he wished.  It basically did not go 
beyond turning a blind eye to some of his activities, and extending some facilities to him, perhaps 
including a modest subsidy.  However, “the great JamÉl al-Dein” was enthusiastically welcomed and 
supported by two political refugees residing in Paris, the Egyptian James Sanua and the Ottoman 
dissident KhÉlid Khanim, and their Paris-based Arabic newspapers, respectively Abu NaÌÌÉrah Zarqah and 
al-BaÎÊr.  While in Paris, AfghÉnÊ had also established postal contacts with some of his followers in 
Beirut, ÑAbdu, AbË TrÉb, al-LaggÉnÊ and AdÊb IshÉq, who were all exiled to the town after the failure of 
ÑUrÉbi’s revolution.  AfghÉnÊ also had support and sympathy from some opposition groups and 
reformers in different Muslim capitals, e.g., the great Tunisian-Ottoman statesman Khayr al-Dein al-
TËnisÊ (1810-1889) and the famous leader of the Algerian Muslim revolt against the French,  ÑAbd al-
QÉdir al-JazaÑirÊ (d. May 1883). 
However, AfghÉnÊ’s activities in Paris were  primarily journalistic.  They included French language articles 
published in Parisian newspapers, and Arabic articles in the two abovementioned Paris based 
newspapers under such titles as “Al-Sharq wa al-SharqiyyÊn” (the Orient and the Orientals).  But his most 
important endeavour in this respect was the founding in France of the weekly Arabic Journal al-ÑUrwah 
al-WuthqÉ (The Firmest Bond), a phrase that AfghÉnÊ borrowed from the Qur’Én (Surat NuÑmÉn, verse 
22).  AfghÉnÊ called his most favoured disciple, MuÍammed ÑAbdu, to Paris to be the editor of this 
journal.  Being a renowned Arabist, ÑAbdu was the architect of the linguistic composition of the journal’s 
articles, but the thought, particularly in the politically focused pieces, was that of Afghani as it reflected 
the ideas he wished to advertise to the general Muslim public.28  The sources of financial support for the 
periodical, as well for AfghÉnÊ and ÑAbdu’s living cost in Paris, cannot be conclusively ascertained, but it 
is reasonable to assume that they were meager and derived mainly from Muslim opposition groups and 
personalities like Prince ×alÊm and the deposed Khedive IsmÉÑil, who both had a greedy eye on the 
Khedivate of Egypt.  This financial constraint was apparently the main reason for the magazine’s short 
seven-month existence, 13 March – 17 October 1884.  The main themes of the eighteen issues of al-
ÑUrwah were hostility to British imperialism, advocacy of pan-Islamism,29 and the interpretation of 
Islamic principles to demonstrate their applicability to urgent contemporary needs. 
Notwithstanding the ban and restrictions imposed by the British authorities on the distribution of the 
journal in the Muslim territories that they controlled, al-ÑUrwah was extensively circulated and widely 
read in the Muslim world in general, but Egypt and India in particular, thanks to the determination of the 
editors and the dedication of their followers in many Muslim capitals, which once more exhibited their 
appreciation of the efficiency of this brand of  mass media in popularising ideas and political 
programmes.  For both its thought and language, al-ÑUrwah was seemingly the most influential journal 
of all the Arabic periodicals of its time.  It, furthermore, had profound impact on thinkers of subsequent 
generations.  The 20th century prominent Islamic revivalists, RashÊd RÊÌa, the owner and founding editor 
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of al-ManÉr magazine, and Hassan al-Bana (1906-1949), the founding murshid (general guide) of the 
society of the Muslim Brotherhood, should be specifically acclaimed in this respect. 
The “revolutionary” Pan-Islamism that AfghÉnÊ forcefully advocated in al-ÑUrwah and other platforms 
was in many ways radically different from the “official” Pan-Islamism that started with 19th century 
Ottoman Sultans, and was then energetically patronised by Sultan ÑAbd al-×ameid II, with the full 
support of the court ÑUlemÉ’, particularly Shaykh Abu al-Huda al-SayyÉdÊ.  “Official Pan-Islamism” had, 
to a large extent, concentrated on the  unity of the Sunni Muslims who were called upon to rally around 
the Ottoman Sultan and his Caliphate that  was  “proclaimed a necessity of faith, transmitted legitimately 
from Abu Bakr down to the Ottomans, the caliph is the shadow of God on earth, the executer of his 
decrees; all Muslims should obey him, being thankful if he does right, patient if he does wrong; even if he 
commands them to break God’s laws, before disobeying they should begin with advices and prayers, 
confident that God is better able to judge him than are they”.30   
While sharing with Sultan ÑAbd  al-×ameid the concern of uniting Muslims in the face of a common 
danger, and willing, though hesitantly, to work with him to serve this cause, AfghÉnÊ wanted this unity to 
be on his own revolutionary terms and to serve his own purposes that were not identical with those of 
the Sultan.  First, the focus of unity should be the religion itself, and not a person or a dynasty; hence 
political factionalism and dynastic interests should not be allowed to stand in the way of unity.  Secondly, 
unity should outweigh doctrinal and traditional enmity, and encompass all Muslims, Sunnis as well as 
ShiÑis.  Since what unite these two groups, one God, one Prophet and one Book (the Qur’Én), is much 
more than what divide them, AfghÉnÊ tried to bridge the doctrinal gulf between the two groups.  To 
extend Pan-Islamism to the ShiÑi world, AfghÉnÊ proposed a reconciliation conference to be held in 
Istanbul and attended by all Muslim  leaders, where the Ottoman Sultan would recognise the Shah and 
give him the ShiÑi holy places in Iraq in return for the latter’s recognition of the Sultan as Caliph.  
However, the Caliphate should have some sort of spiritual authority over the Muslims, but not 
necessarily political and military domination.  Thus, AfghÉnÊ did not want to revive the united caliphate 
of the past or to impose a single Islamic state.  If the spirit of cooperation existed, he optimistically 
argued, a confederation of Islamic states could be formed under the spiritual guidance of a devout, just 
and tolerant ruler.  But these conditions were too drastic to be even discussed by the autocratic ÑAbd al-
×ameid II, and AfghÉnÊ’s revolutionary Pan-Islamism had to wait for a chance of success in the distant 
future, i.e., the formation in 1969 of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (O.I.C.), a platform in which 
the ShiÑi and Sunni states have tried to cooperate on issues upon which they agree, and to forgive each 
other on matters in which they disagree.  
At this juncture, it may be useful to dwell at some length on the position of JamÉl al-Dein al-AfghÉnÊ 
towards the Mahdist revolution (1881-1885) that flared in the Sudan almost at the same time of his 
arrival in Europe, an issue that had hardly been addressed in all the scholarly works on the Sudanese 
Mahdiyya.  In defiance of the Ottoman Caliph and the court ÑUlemÉ, the charismatic and pious leader of 
this movement, MuÍammed AÍmad ibn ÑAbdullÉh, declared himself the Mahdi, and waged a jihÉd 
against the “infidels”, who, to him, included all non-believers in his Mahdiyya.  The followers of the 
Mahdi, styled by their leaders as the “AnÎÉr” in obvious parallelism with the Prophet, inflicted heavy 
defeats on the Ottoman forces, that were often led by British generals.  They captured some European 
priests and adventurers, and killed a couple of British officers, notably General Hicks Pasha in the battle 
of Shaykan in 5 November, 1883, and the legendary General Gordon on 26 January, 1885.  These and 
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other dramatic events brought the Mahdi to international prominence, and aroused tremendous 
concern, anxiety and alarm in Europe. 
Some European writers maintained that JamÉl al-Dein al-AfghÉnÊ viewed himself “a messianic saviour”, 
a “Muslim Luther” or even a Mahdi.  Admittedly, the man thought very highly of himself and his abilities 
to effect revolutionary change presumably single-handed, but these apocalyptic charges seemingly went 
too far; and appeared to be engendered by the “over reading” of these writer’s of some of AfghÉnÊ ‘s 
literature.31  The man appeared to have seriously doubted, or altogether rejected, the religious 
legitimacy of the Mahdist notion, and certainly did not believe in the religious pretentions of the 
Sudanese Mahdi.  But it was quite natural that he tried to channel the spectacular victories of this 
revolution in the service of his ambitious political agenda to end European political imperialism, cultural 
domination and economic exploitation of the Muslim world. 
The general Muslims were by the last quarter of the 19th century dominated by the perception that 
Europe was predestined to be superior.  Hence, apathy, indifference and helplessness towards European 
domination in general, and that of Britain in particular was the rule of the day.  To recharge self-
confidence in the Muslim masses, al-AfghÉnÊ and his students emphasized, often exaggerated, in al-
ÑUrwah and elsewhere the scope and significance of the Mahdist victories against the British.  They 
forcefully argued that these victories illustrate the Muslim long-held presumption that the British 
military might was too strong to be defeated was nothing but an illusion and a dangerous one.  The 
Mahdist victories showed what Muslims could do if only they were awakened.32  Had Egypt and India 
been really awakened and united, Britain could never have secured a foothold. This and other views may 
have been expressed in a too sweeping way, but this jargon must be viewed with the aims behind it, 
namely to arouse men’s spirits, and to propel them to give up once and for all their damaging defeatism 
and fatalism.  Only then could the Muslim expel the imperialists from their land, and restore their 
glorious past.  For, as the Qur’Én vividly says, “Verily God does not change the state of a people until 
they change themselves inwardly”.  In other words, AfghÉnÊ strove to employ the Mahdist impressive 
victories in his psychological war against the British, in particular to secure the withdrawal of their 
occupation forces from Egypt and India. 
 
Besides, al-AfghÉnÊ tried to make use of these victories in the diplomatic front.  Though under great 
pressure to avenge the “brutal” murder of the “great son of the British Empire”, General Gordon, the 
British government had briefly and hesitantly explored the possibility of a truce or a negotiated deal with 
the Mahdi.  On a few occasions, Gladestone’s government hinted to Blunt that it might be interested to 
use him and “his Muslim friends” for dialogue with the Mahdi.   
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Blunt, who was strongly against the British occupation of Egypt, took these seemingly casual hints 
seriously.  In June 1884, he brought ÑAbdu to London, and by February 1885, he traveled by himself to 
Paris to discuss the issue of the Mahdi with al-AfghÉnÊ.  The latter came to London in July, 1885, where 
Blunt gave him an entrée to the British ruling circles.  In a meeting on 23 July, 1885 with Lord Randolph 
Churchill, then at the height of his brief power, AfgÉnÊ discussed the affairs of the Sudanese Mahdi, even 
suggested an Anglo-Muslim alliance against the Russians.  Blunt had, in fact, proposed that AfghÉnÊ, or 
one of his aides, would be the right emissary to the Mahdi, and asked that Britain guarantee his safe 
passage down the Nile through British lines to the Mahdist capital Omdurman.  
On his part, al-AfghÉnÊ posed himself as the best go-between because of his alleged paramount 
influence and extensive contacts with the Mahdi through some of his close followers who studied under 
him in al-Azhar.  Concurrently, AfghÉnÊ cautioned of the dire consequences that would be fallen on 
Britain if it missed this diplomatic opening.  A further serious Mahdist victory, he insisted “would 
incontestably pass, in the eyes of the Muslims, for a second miracle”, and “would have as a fatal 
consequence not only the provocation of an insurrection in the Islamic countries under Ottoman 
domination, as well as in Baluchistan, Afghanistan, Sind, India Bukhara, Kokand, Khiva – but also lead to 
troubles in Tripoli, Tunisia, Algeria, and as far as Morocco.  For all Muslim await the Mahdi and consider 
his arrival as an absolute necessity”.33  Another article published in the last issue of al-ÑUrwah al-
Wuthqa (18 October, 1884) concludes, “If the Mahdi should advance and gets the support of the 
courageous peoples of upper Egypt, then uprisings would break out in India, and Russia would advance 
and free the Indians from the yoke of slavery”.34 
While exaggerating the significance and impact of the Mahdist revolution in the Muslim world, al-
AfghÉnÊ claimed that the Mahdi would be reluctant to negotiate after his dramatic capture of Khartoum.  
Nonetheless, AfghÉnÊ insisted that his presumed good offices with the Mahdi would guarantee peace if 
Britain becomes conciliatory towards the Muslim.  In particular, he demanded that Britain abandon the 
Sudan, hand over the port of Suakin to the Ottoman Sultan, use its influence with Italy to withdraw from 
the port of Massaowa, and, above all, evacuate Egypt and place its government under the suzerainty of 
the Ottoman Sultan.  However, the British government abruptly called off this diplomatic maneuver, and 
eventually, on 2 March, 1896, decided to crush the Mahdiyya by force.  While a friend of Blunt 
considered the whole episode “humbug” on Gladestone’s part, Blunt felt that Cromer, Britain’s Consul-
General in Egypt (1883-1906), was behind the decision to close the chapter.  The Sultan may have also 
played a role as he was known for his mistrust of AfghÉnÊ, whom he suspected to be a partisan of the 
Mahdi.  But apparently the root cause for giving up this attempt, which, anyhow, was not taken 
seriously, was Gladestone’s realisation that AfghÉnÊ and his associates had no influence or contacts 
whatsoever with the Mahdi, a fact that is conclusively established in the Mahdist literature.  However, 
on the part of AfghÉnÊ, these wild assertions appear to be a sheer publicity stunt. 
Science, the urgency of the acquisition of scientific knowledge by Muslims and the benefits of modern 
science constituted a major theme in AfghÉnÊ’s speeches and writings.  Being a religion that is based on 
knowledge, Islam, he forcefully argued, prepared the way for science and philosophy, and was the prime 
mover of the Muslim early drive to acquire scientific knowledge from different sources and nations, 
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particularly the Greeks and the Persians.  His unequivocal support for modern science, and sharp 
criticism of the then ÑulemÉ’s “blindness” and hostility to this discipline was articulately expressed in a 
lecture, entitled “On teaching and learning”, that he delivered in Calcutta, India in 1880.  It deserves to 
be quoted at length here: 
“The strangest thing is that our Ñulema’ of these days have divided science into two 
parts.  One they call Muslim science, and one European science.  Because of this 
they forbid others to teach some of the useful sciences.  They have not understood 
that science is that noble thing that has no connection with any nation, and is not 
distinguished by anything but itself.  Rather,  everything that is known is known by 
science and every nation that becomes renowned becomes renowned through 
science …   The truth is where there is proof, and those who forbid science and 
knowledge in the belief that they are safeguarding the Islamic religion are really the 
enemy of that religion.  The Islamic religion is the closet religion to science, and 
there is no incompatibility between science and knowledge and the foundation of 
the Islamic faith.”35 
Al- AfghÉni’s conviction of the total compatibility between Islam and science was further articulated in a 
heated dialogue that he had on the subject in Paris with the French philosopher Ernest Renan.  In a 
lecture entitled “Islam and Science”, delivered in the Sorbonne University on 29 March, 1883 and 
published in the Journal des Debats of the same day, Renan maintained that Islam and science, and 
implicitly Islam and modernity, are at loggerheads.  Being by its very nature a dogmatic religion that 
imposed heavy restrictions on the human mind, in his words, “the heaviest chain that humanity has ever 
borne”, Islam, in Renan’s view, is squarely unscientific.  It, he added, “had done nothing but harm to 
human reason.”36 
 
While happily agreeing with Renan and other European free thinkers that Christianity is unreasonable, 
even the enemy of science and progress, al-AfghÉnÊ persuasively argued in his response of 18 May, 
1883, entitled “Answer to Renan,”37  that the case of Islam is completely different. Its essence is the 
same as that of modern rationalism, thus it is in complete harmony with the principles discovered by 
scientific reason.  Being neither irrational nor intolerant, Islam, he added, is a thinking religion that is 
demanded by reason.  It encourages human beings to use their minds freely, and is alone among the 
great religions that “liberates the human mind from illusions and superstitions”.  In other discourses, al- 
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AfghÉnÊ emphasized some Qur’Énic phrases that firmly, but sarcastically, order the Muslims to reflect 
and comprehend e.g., “aflÉ tatafakarËm”, “iflÉ tubÎirËn.” 
Whilst expounding the virtues and indispensability of science, AfghÉnÊ had, to his credit, his own 
independent ideas on the discipline.  He stressed that science needed another “comprehensive science” 
so to speak, which would enable human beings to know how to apply each field of science in its just and 
right place.  This is the vital field of falsafa or hikma (philosophy), which, in his words, “shows the 
sciences what is necessary …. (and) employs each of the sciences in its proper place.”38                                                                              
Al-AfghÉnÊ’s failure to use the Mahdist card to pressurise Britain to evacuate Egypt and other Muslim 
territories had certainly frustrated him.  Nevertheless, he did not give up the struggle, and tried to attain 
the very same objective through another maneuver, namely an anti-British Muslim – Russian alliance.  
Hence, was his plan to leave England in the spring of 1886 to Russia via Iran.  However, while temporarily 
in Bushehr, probably to collect his books, already shipped by AbË TurÉb from Egypt to this Persian town, 
AfghÉnÊ was invited to Tehran by the minister of press on behalf of the Shah, NÉsir al-DÊn ShÉh.  Thus, 
instead of directly traveling from Bushehr to Russia, as originally planned, al-AfghÉnÊ remained for a 
lengthened one-year stay in Iran, May 1886-May 1887.    
Initially, the Shah had seemingly positive interest in al- AfghÉnÊ, to whom he was introduced as a 
renowned intellectual, and a defender of Muslim states against foreign intervention, and may have 
thought of using his reputation to consolidate his rule.  But the autocrat and the revolutionary were 
bound to clash, and very quickly.  Right from the beginning, and in the first and only audience that the 
Shah gave to AfghÉnÊ in Tehran, the former was reportedly “frightened and repelled” by a remark that 
the latter said to him, namely that he was like a “sharp sword”39  who should not be idle but given an 
important task to do,40 presumably to be used against foreign encroachment.  Furthermore, the Shah 
was disturbed by AfghÉnÊ’s extensive contacts with the public and the notables in Tehran,41 where he 
advocated his revolutionary ideas, particularly the importance of the rule of law, and ferociously 
attacked the foreigners, particularly the British, with whom the Shah was trying to cultivate friendly 
relations.  All in all, the Shah viewed AfghÉnÊ as a potential danger to his throne, and soon broke up with 
him.  With the possible encouragement, or the instigation, of the British, the Shah ordered the expulsion 
of al- AfghÉnÊ from Iran, but directed that the deportation be undertaken in “an informal and friendly 
manner”, and the man was actually taken “gently” to the frontiers. His Majesty had reluctantly allowed 
this superficial courtesy because AfghÉnÊ was his “guest”, and in case that he would need his services 
sometime in the future.  Anyhow, as explained below, this development prepared the ground for 
AfghÉnÊ’s second, but dramatic, coming to Iran, in 1889.  On his part, AfghÉnÊ  may have been willing to 
quit the country because he was unable to achieve the main target of his sojourn, namely to enlist the 
support of the Shah to his projected Muslim - Russian alliance.  A British report recorded AfghÉnÊ’s 
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desire to leave Iran in the following diplomatic words,” He found Persia too hot for his advanced 
ideas.”42    
On the invitation of a Russian friend since his days in Paris, Katkov, who was also a prominent journalist 
and a close friend of the Tsar, AfghÉnÊ headed from Iran to Russia where he stayed, first in Moscow and 
then in St. Petersburg, for about two years, from the spring of 1887 until mid 1889.  Previously, Katkov 
had incited to Russia an Indian chief, Maharajah Dalip Singh (1838-1893), the last ruler of the Sikh 
Kingdom of the Punjab who had been deposed by the British in 1849.  Having an axe to grind with the 
British, and anxious to restore his lost throne, the Mahrajah cooperated with AfghÉnÊ in his anti-British 
enterprises.  From Moscow, they issued and distributed manifestoes, signed by the so-called Executive of 
the Indian Liberation Society, that called for a general uprising in India and the speedy end of British rule 
in the country.43  While in Russia, AfghÉnÊ was also reported to have been connected with the Islamic 
League, aspired for an official post in Russian Turkistan in order to propagate Islamic unity there, and 
entertained the idea of starting “an Arabic Persian newspaper in favour of the Russian Government.”44     
 
Meanwhile, to counter the strong and rising Russian economic and political influence in Iran, the British 
government intensified its effort to have a stronger footing in Iran, which culminated in the 
appointment, in 1888 and up to 1890, of the prominent British statesman Henry Drummond Wolff as the 
British minister to Iran.  Wolff’s aggressive diplomacy in support of British interests, coupled with the 
Shah’s desire to be in accord with Britain, earned the latter some important economic concessions in 
Iran.  To the grave concern of Russia, the Shah had, for example, succumbed to British pressure to open 
in 1888 the Karun, Iran’s major navigable river, to international commerce, and to give Britain virtually all 
the mining rights in Iran.  Iran gave Britain “the Imperial Bank Concession of 1889”, which invested in a 
British company the right to “build the first modern bank in Iran with a monopoly of the issuance of 
paper money.”45    
Being already in sharp disagreement with the Iranian government over its resistance to reform and 
compromise on the country’s sovereignty and independence, al- AfghÉnÊ was furious by this accelerating 
Anglophile policy of the government.  Hence, he tried to resist it by some newspaper articles and 
speeches in which he tried to impress upon the Russian public that these concessions would strip their 
country from its historical power and influence in Iran.  His ultimate objective was to provoke the 
Russian government into war with Britain, which, he expected, would incite a general uprising in India 
against British rule.   
Through completely informal and unofficial discussions, AfghÉnÊ may have established contacts with 
some Russian officials, and could have had a kind of impression on the Russian society.  But his two years 
mission in Russia, like all his previous and subsequent periods of sojourn in eastern and western capitals, 
failed to accomplish anything substantial.  A combination of factors were at work.  The death of his host 
Katkov immediately after his arrival at the country had practically left him in the wilderness.  Russian 
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officials had on the whole given him the cold shoulder, and turned down his repeated pleas and hints to 
give any official nature to his presence in their country.  The government refused his request to be 
appointed in a post in Russian Turkistan in order to propagate Islamic unity there and elsewhere because 
this “would be utterly inconsistent with the official tradition and usages of Russia.”46 More importantly, 
notwithstanding the accelerating anti-British feeling in Russia, particularly over Iran, the country had no 
stomach for a new war.  For it had recently emerged from a costly war with the Ottomans, and was 
experiencing difficult financial constraints.  Thus, AfghÉnÊ’s repeated pleas for a Russo-British war fell on 
deaf ears. 
Faced with this deadlock that made his further stay in Russia virtually meaningless, AfghÉnÊ had no 
immediate option except to try once more to appease the Shah, and to get back in the good grace of his 
main advisers in as dignified manner as possible.  He took the opportunity of the Shah’s brief stop at St. 
Petersburg, in the summer of 1889 on his way to an official trip to Western Europe, to try to see His 
Majesty, and to approach some of his entourage requesting appointments “to refute with sure proofs 
the lies that liars had spread about him”.47 He even left Russia in mid 1889 and joined the Shah’s party in 
Munich, Germany.  However, in another letter to a wealthy and well connected Persian merchant, dated 
27 March, 1889, AfghÉnÊ proudly said that all he had said and done was in the interest of the Muslim 
community, and that “God knew the righteous of his deeds and ways”.  If Iran or anybody in Iran harms 
him, he warned, God will severely punish him, as he did to his prior persecutors, the Ottoman 
government, the Khedive of Egypt and the AfghÉnÊ AmÊr ShÊr ÑAlÊ.48         
On his part, ShÉh NÉsir al-DÊn seemed to have felt that the continued presence of AfghÉnÊ in Russia 
would aggravate hostility to him in that country.  Moreover, since AfghÉnÊ posed to have personal ties 
with top Russian officials, the Shah and his ministers may have entertained the idea of using his 
presumed good offices to help smooth the Russian recent anger at them.  Though he continued to 
mistrust AfghÉnÊ , the Shah chose the lesser of the two evils so to speak, and invited him back to Iran.  
Thus started a new chapter in the man’s turbulent life. 
On AfghÉnÊ’s second coming to Tehran in December, 1889, the Shah, as suggested above, was not 
deadly against him.  However, partially under the influence, perhaps the instigation too, of his 
excessively Anglophile chief minister, Amin al-Sultan, the Shah soon became bitter against his invitee.  In 
a highly unusual step, he ordered in February 1891 that AfghÉnÊ be forcibly and humiliatingly49 expelled 
from a shrine near Tehran that he took refugee in, irrespective of the plea of AmÊn al-Sultan himself, 
who wanted the deportation to be undertaken in a quiet and unostentatious manner in order to avoid a 
possible outcry in the country and abroad.  A more important factor for the Shah’s extreme position 
versus AfghÉnÊ was his growing fear of his presence in the country, and that he might become the focus 
of the rising opposition to his regime.  In particular, the Shah was apparently convinced that AfghÉnÊ was 
the instigator, if not the actual writer, of some anonymous and widely distributed letters and leaflets 
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that abused His Majesty and advocated an immediate overthrow of his corrupt regime.  One such 
placard incited the Iranian ruling elite into revolt against the tyranny and treason of the Shah by saying: 
“Before you become the slave of the foreigners like the natives of India you may find 
a remedy.  Your silence and endurance have caused a great surprise to the ÑUlemÉ’ 
and the people.  The former have always protected the religion, should you show 
any energy they are ready to help you.  If you do not fear for the destruction of the 
religion, you may, at least, care for your worldly affairs and fear the misfortune of 
your friends, the evil speaking of historians, the curse and derision of your 
descendants, and the contemptuous laughter which the foreigners now cast on 
you.”50  
 
Even in hindsight, al-AfghÉnÊ remained extremely embittered about his degrading banishment to 
Ottoman Iraq.  He voiced this bitterness in several newspaper interviews, articles and speeches that he 
delivered in his subsequent destinations, London 1891/92 and Istanbul since the summer of 1892, in 
which he gave his own story of his seizure and treatment, and held the Shah, personally and squarely, 
responsible for his ordeal.  No wonder that AfghÉnÊ threw his lot during the remaining years of his life 
against the “blood thirsty tyrant”, the Shah, his “infidel” chief minister and his corrupt regime that 
AfghÉnÊ was determined to uproot once and for all and at all cost.  To achieve this “noble” goal, AfghÉnÊ 
coordinated with all shades of the Iranian opposition within and outside the country, the religious, the 
liberals, the secular, the modernists and the westernizers.  While in London, he was, for example, in 
association with the editor of a Persian London-based newspaper, al-QanËn, Malkum Khan, a European 
educated son of an Armenian convert who had been dismissed from his post as the Iranian minister in 
London on charges of corruption. 
Meanwhile, the Iranian resistance gained momentum by the so-called Tobacco concession of March 
1890, which gave a British company monopoly on the purchase, sale and export of all Persian tobacco.  
Since many Iranians depended for their livelihood in whole or in part on tobacco cultivation and trade, 
mass and violent protest movements spread throughout the Iranian cities.  The government was 
compelled to cancel the concession, but the tobacco revolt continued to reach its nadir by the 
assassination of the hateful Shah NasÊr al-DÊn in 1 May 1896.51  AfghÉnÊ repeatedly denied complicity, 
but some compelling evidence, including the testimony of the assassin, MÊrzÉ RidÉ, who was said to be  
a disciple of AfghÉnÊ, supported his involvement, at least as an inspirer if not an instigator. 
Though remaining suspicious of AfghÉnÊ, the shrewd Sultan ÑAbd al-×ameid recalled him from London 
to Istanbul.  While primarily motivated by keenness to keep the outspoken AfghÉnÊ under strict 
surveillance, the Sultan may have also planned to use his good offices to persuade the ShiÑi ÑulemÉ’ to 
support his claim to the caliphate.  Nonetheless, ÑAbd al-×ameid soon turned against al- AfghÉnÊ largely 
because of the influential Abu al-Huda who publicly accused AfghÉnÊ of irreligion.  Moreover, AfghÉnÊ 
was suspected of intriguing with the Sultan’s opponents, notably the former Khedive of Egypt ÑAbbas 
×ilmÊ (1874-1944), who was reportedly plotting for an Arab caliphate under his control, and Sayyid 
ÑAbdullÉh of Hijaz, an opponent of the Sultan.  However, notwithstanding his turning down of the 
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repeated demands of the Iranian government to extradite AfghÉnÊ to face trial in Iran on the pretext of 
insufficient evidence and that he was an AfghÉnÊ not a Persian, Sultan ÑAbd al-Hameid prohibited 
AfghÉnÊ from conducting any anti-Iranian activity, refused his plea to leave Istanbul and kept him 
virtually under house arrest.  The man died in Istanbul lonely and completely broken on 9 March, 1897. 
Conclusion 
JamÉl al-DÊn al-AfghÉnÊ was indeed a man of vision, who devoted his life to caution his co-religionists of 
the evils and dire consequences of imperialism, and urged them to evict it from their homelands.  
However, the entrenchment of despotism in Muslim countries coupled with AfghÉni’s own negligence to 
build an organisation for his almost exclusively elitist movement had sharply limited his political 
successes and influence during his lifetime.  For most of his life, this gifted man was disappointed, 
frustrated and presumably bitter, and he died under conditions that tantamounted to solitary 
confinement.  
Nonetheless, al- AfghÉnÊ’s sincerity and dedication to the Muslim cause as well as his religio-intellectual 
legacy were posthumously extensively studied and hugely admired and appreciated across the Muslim 
world.  His career and thought constituted the theme of many international conferences, seminars and 
workshops that were held in many Muslim cities.  The last major one that I know was held in March, 
1998 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia to celebrate AfghÉnÊ’s centenary under the title “Al-AfghÉnÊ and the 
Asian Renaissance”, and much of the debates that he began are still part and parcel of the contemporary 
intellectual climate of the Umma.  Al-AfghÉnÊ inspired, to varying degrees, many movements and 
personalities: the Islamists, the nationalists and even the socialists, who maintained that he advocated 
Muslim socialism.  But his reformist project was particularly and enthusiastically taken up by the 20th 
century Islamic modernists, who shared his worldview that the twin sources – the Qur’Én and Sunnah – 
provide the correct and lasting answer to the many predicaments of the Muslim world and humanity at 
large if properly understood and creatively interpreted.  Around his vision, that had been articulated and 
fine tuned by his two major disciples, MuÍammad ÑAbdu and RashÊd RiÌÉ, emerged a new reformist 
school, the so-called neo-Salafiyyah, which Hassan al-Bana tried to transform through his Muslim 
Brotherhood into a living tradition.  
In a nutshell, al-AfghÉnÊ was born well ahead of his time, and we have sufficient evidence to claim that 
he was the precursor of a variety of 20th century movements, including the all important 1919 national 
Egyptian revolution that was masterminded by his  former student SaÑad Zaghlul.  His early call for a 
Sunni ShiÑi reconciliation and a broad confederation of Muslim states may also justify calling him the 
“father” or “custodian” of the Organisation of Islamic Coperation (OIC) that was founded in 1969.  One 
would, furthermore, really wonders whether AfghÉnÊ proposed Muslim-Muslim rapprochement and 
pan-Islamic unity may constitute a basis for addressing the current devastating and spiral conflicts and 
disarray in the Muslim world.  In this respect, it may be interesting to reflect on and comprehend some 
of al-‘Urwah’s articles, two of which are entitled in English rendering, “The Past and Present of the 
Ummah and the Cure of its Diseases” and “The Backwardness and Apathy of the Ummah and the Reason 
for this.”52 
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